Third Party Review
March 10th, 2010 by Jordan Del-Grande (Dedicated Page)After conducting a number of third party reviews over the years, I thought I would write up a sample of some of the common assumptions organisations make in thinking the third party is securely protecting their best interests. The scope of this blog will be for either a link to a nationally highly secure environment or an international secure environment.
I am going to skip all the audit items listed in an ISO standard as these can be downloaded and checked off as part of any security & risk baseline review. There are some pretty comprehensive audit documents up on the Isaca website and also papers in their journal!
Firstly, I want to lay out the scenery: You have engaged a third party vendor who has a dedicated site. They are to connect over a cloud using a VPN tunnel (Internet, MPLS, IPLC). They come in through your third party connection DMZ (hopefully) where they are authenticated (2FA with tokens) and then authorised (AD, Novell, etc) where a virtual machine is pushed back using some middleware (Windows RPC, Citrix, Desktop Broker, XEN, etc). So in a nutshell it looks like this
Third Party <-> Cloud <-> Organisation DMZ <-> Organisation Applications & Databases
The third party has provided you with a slide deck that outlines how secure their site is…It probably goes a little something like this -> We have a global footprint and can “follow the sun” -> we are “IOS/IEC 27001:2005” certified- > our ODC/Production floor set up is a simple 1,2, 3, 4 process (no dramas as long as we dictate what you require) ->our networks are secure as we use “firewalls” and “virus scan” with an “IPS” -> our hardware is secure as they are “hardened” -> we follow all the high level security controls -> we have an in-built security team with “incident response”, DR and BCP options -> You know the spiel
Each one of the above items, both the infrastructure and the slides can easily be picked apart, but one section I really want to hone in on is something I raised at a Citrix education workshop a number of years ago.
Let’s assume you follow what the vendor has laid out for you above and you also have a highly secure vendor connection set-up. After all, you spent money having it designed by Architects, having it reviewed by Risk, having it penetration tested by Security, and finally having it audited by an external firm. This end-to-end remote connection infrastructure is tight!
But none of the above is really that important when you go and give the guys on the other end the keys to access your back-end systems. I guess I shouldn’t say it isn’t important, but more that it becomes superficial. Much like how a boat with an awesome motor is superficial when there is a hole in the bottom.
What I have noticed with a number of security/risk professionals is that once they start hearing those buzz words like firewall, VPN, 2FA, Citrix with lockdown, physically secure room, swipe card, guard on door, etc. They tick off the boxes on their audit checklist but forget to ask the holistic type of questions. Again, it is much like saying, motor…check, steering wheel…check, double bed with champagne…check, and forgetting to ask if there is a hole in the bottom because the water is still out of view.
As an example, the question I asked at the Citrix seminar was in regards to copying & pasting out of Citrix. Most people quickly assumed I was either an idiot and didn’t know about the options to disable this setting, as well as share drive mappings. They were more then happy to quickly proceed to wind bag about how the configuration settings should look. Again, it is that checklist mentality where I already know about the optional settings as I downloaded it too! Reciting my mums shopping list doesn’t show I am intelligent, it just shows I like to memorise things that could in fact just be written down.
Anyway, the question I was asking was broader…Although you can have all the secure settings enabled, what if the individual on the other end decides to screenshot from their laptop the information that is in their Citrix session?
Surprisingly (or not depending on your view), at the time when I reiterated the question for them, the room went silent. They hadn’t thought about this question before and as such didn’t have a checklist in memory to recite back. They were in a sense a program without a piece of code to execute…”DO NO COMPUTE”. As such, the question was brushed and we moved on.
I didn’t mind at the time, because all I was really doing was pressure testing the awareness of this issue. And what was discovered was a lack of awareness, or said in another way, ignorance. You see, in the above requirements set out by the third party, which you agreed too, they require access to their systems for general operational day-to-day processes. This includes things like, time sheets, intranet sites, FTP sites, Internet access, email access, etc.
So if by chance one of the third party agents decides to run a screen capturing tool all day long whilst performing their job (e.g., production support with customer details, development code with intellectual property, back office work with more customer details, etc), they can be gradually screen scraping this information out unbeknownst to you or the third party – You cannot see this occurring as you have already given them the keys to view this information to perform their job role. And the third party cannot see it as it is not a virus or an exploit of attack that will trigger the Anti-Virus or IPS – In short, you just got hosed.
I have plenty of other nice examples like the above, but this blog is long enough as it is. If ever you would like to discuss any of these, I am always available for a chat.
I just love this stuff…